I find this a slightly difficult paper to review. I have suggested major corrections, but it would be useful to have a bit more context as to why the article was requested. The subject matter is not new and has been written about by several people, notably Mike Hulme, Sheila Jasanoff, David Livingstone, Matthias Heymann and the author himself. The content is therefore not new. This isn’t in itself necessarily a problem, as the author implies that the editors specifically asked him to submit this journal for a reader based in non-linear dynamics. I can certainly see a useful re-writing of this relatively well-trodden path for an audience with this training, but I don’t necessarily see that here.

At the very least the piece requires a re-write as there are several editorial issues. I’ve made a few specific questions below. More significantly, the conclusions seem to fade away. I was expecting from the abstract an argument along the lines of Hulme’s 2011 paper on climate reductionism, i.e. that the politicisation of science and scientisation of politics has meant that determinism has appeared again, perhaps because scientists are now claiming legitimacy to speak about climate-related issues that do not match their ‘CUDO’ training. However, this argument isn’t specifically made, and the argument instead comes to quite an abrupt end.

Some minor points:

Line 46 – it would be good to add a little more detail about ‘the catastrophe of racial determinism and colonialisms’ and how this related to climatology. It would perhaps also be useful to explain why the Second World War was the apex of this thinking. This also isn’t really explained when it comes around again in the narrative, around line 95.

Line 113 – should be 2021

Line 117 – the narrative takes quite a shift here, from a historical account to a discussion of epistemology in climate science. At the very least this needs to be signposted

Lines 148-158 – can you add references here (e.g. for the ‘gap model’)?

This paper touches upon relevant topics. An analysis of the modern shift in climate science towards more quantitative/deterministic/predictive endeavours is nowadays more important than ever. This is especially so in light of the hostility that developing and promising qualitative approaches, such as the storyline approach, have received. Also, the paper illustrates early incipient aspects of climate justice, especially in terms of colonialist attitudes, which require revision for tackling the challenges we face today. The text is also clear and easy to follow.

Having said this, the overall point – that climate science is a social endeavour – seems a platitude by now. In this sense, it seems to me that this contribution may play fruitful pedagogical or communication roles. But if intended as an “original” contribution, it does not seem to have much of an original claim to make. In addition, the scope of the paper is, on my estimation, too broad, both in terms of its theoretical framework and the subjects. In terms of its theoretical framework, it is unclear to me how much of a contribution to the argument is the introduction of the concepts of post-normal science and CUDOS. This is especially troubling because the concepts are employed very lightly, used to advance a point in the argument but not critically analysed. And, in terms of the subjects, the paper goes from colonialism to climate denialism, over centuries of global human history. This kind of ambition may not even be suitable for a book or series of books.  

I would recommend going deeper into specific aspects touched upon in the paper. For example, specific historical episodes could be analysed in more detail and used as case studies to illustrate the embodying changes in our perceptions of climate. It is clear that the author has vast knowledge on these subjects, especially in terms of the references used. The recommendation is for the author to channel this knowledge in lines of argument that are pursued in depth.

Specific points:

• I would change the title. As it is proven by a comment above, it leads to think that this is the contribution of the paper, namely, to show that climate science is social. It seems that the aim of the paper is to show specific ways in which the social dynamics of climate science have reflected in changes in practices.
• The author writes in the abstract: “the topic of climate – in the sense of “usual weather” - has in the western tradition attracted attention as a possible explanatory factor”. Possible explanatory factor of what? This becomes clearer in the main text but should be made explicit in the abstract too.
• It is not obvious to me that Humboldt’s definition of climate illustrates the quantitative drive of modern approaches to climate (L.39). More explicitly, there is no mention to quantities, calculations, predictions, or something of sorts.

TYPOS

L.26: i.e.., = i.e.,

L.46: 1098 = 1898

L.73: Ellsworth Huntington drew… = Ellsworth Huntington, who drew…

L.81: Ghe = The

L.106: signific ant = significant

Review of "Brief communication: Climate science as a social process -- history, climatic determinism, CUDOS and post-normality". 

Climate science is not straightforward to define. The author traces its history, mentioning its use at the service of racial ideologies, its entry in the scope of  physics where, according to the author, it has been transformed and policed by the adoption of modern scientific norms. Climate science is then touched by the post-normal revolution, with, using the author's terms: science being "de-scientized" and politized, while policymaking being "de-politicized" and "scientized". 

These four pages touch thus on many, many issues: history of science, climate determinism, science-policy interface, science public interface, scientific norms, social construction of sciences, dilemmas. With so many subjects, each of which the object of specific research  involving scientists in STEM and human sciences, the tone is necessarily editorial, and, arguably, a bit forced at places. The cautionary advice about the risks of scientific research drifting from "mathematical rigor" to "political utility" is legitimate. However, with only three of the  articles listed in the bibliography (excluding self-citations) postdating 2000, the reader might be left to think that research about values (and their management) in climate science (Winsberg,  Lloyd, Jebeile), climate change communication (Russill, Dahan, Guillemot,  Hulme), emergence and influence of earth system sciences and their political imprint (Dutreuil) --- to cite only but a very few actors active in these domains -- has not taken place over the last 20 years. The COVID pandemics has also boosted research and forums about the policy-expert interface. It results that many claims in this editorial may appear reasonable at first, but fail being fully convincing or useful, lacking a more solid bibliographic basis and specific concluding recommendations. 

Among problematic points:

 - according to the author, climate science inherited modern scientific norms when it entered the domain of physics. This statement seem to ignore that geography, as a discipline, also evolved and adopted modern scientific norms. As a general rule, I found  geographical sciences to be  connoted pretty negatively in  this essay. Why, for example, would the "re-entry" of geographical sciences (l. 54) imply a tacit determinism ? 

 - who "climate scientists" are is not defined, so that the sentence "climate scientists transgress regularly into policy-prescribing" is not given much substance. Several high-impact articles about climate change, Earth governance, mitigation, and "tipping points" have been first-authored by  scientists who would not describe themselves as "climate scientists", but perhaps rather as "Earth system scientists". In any case, the generalisation seems  dangerous, not complying with good practice in history of sciences,  and perhaps counterproductive. 

 - It is claimed that the output of science "is considered determining political needs" (l. 55). Which science, and which needs are we talking about ? 

 - Of course climate science is embedded in a social construction, and the norm of "disinterestedness" is unavoidably challenged by the fact experts in climate change are likely to feel personally concerned about climate change.  They would be concerned in a different and more intimate way than, perhaps, a cosmologist is concerned by the fate of a black hole. Many climate scientists are concerned and "interested" in their research by the very fact that they live on Earth and may feel anger, fear, empathy when studying the causes, mechanisms and consequences of climate change. Put differently, the Mertonian norm of disinterestedness is challenged by a morale imperative imposed on climate scientists, which emerges from the responsibility of detaining useful knowledge in a changing world. Again, the author is making a valid point by stressing the risks generated by this "post-normal" context. Yes, non-epistemic values enter the production and communication of climate science. However, it is not clear here what is the author proposal to cope with this situation. Non-epistemic values cannot be suppressed and therefore not ignored. Constructive proposal should provide mechanisms to manage them, which may require innovative practices. 

 As noted by other reviewers, the paper needs some editorial work (misprints, citations, unclear sentences) but these will be more effectively addressed after  the main comments.